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FRIEDELBAUMt

the Supreme Court during the past half-decade have centered
judicial pronouncements which, critics contend, reflect an excessively narrow view of state powers. While some of these criticisms
question directly the institutional role of the Court, more often they represent
expressions of displeasure with respect to a single holding or a particular line of
decisions interpretive of federal-state relationships. Among hostile groups, the
labeling of a decision as that of the "Warren Court"1 serves to evoke an
emotional response usually reserved for the forum of partisan politics. Nor are
such outbursts limited to persons or organizations ordinarily unconcerned or
unacquainted with the judicial process. Indeed, the leadership for such "crusades" against the Court has come from professional associations which, in
former years, could be counted among the most outspoken defenders of a
2
vigorously assertive judiciary.
What factors have called forth the most recent barrage of invective from
presumably responsible state advocates and their supporters in Congress? Has
the Court deliberately reentered the political thicket from which it seemed to
have emerged following the contest of the 1930's? Is the Court guilty of an
excessive degree of judicial activism in the determination of federal-state issues? Exploration of these questions requires a reappraisal of the Court's
behavior in those traditional but vital areas which relate to the apportionment
of powers between nation and state. The bases of conflict will be familiar to all
students of the American constitutional system and its development. A modern
garb presents variants, but the contour of power relationships and the nature
of the struggle for control remain essentially unchanged.
TACKS UPON

Aabout

t Assistant Professor of Politcal Science, Rutgers University.
I Since President Eisenhower's appointment of the present Chief Justice in 1953, four new

associate Justices-Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, and Stewart-have joined the Court. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas represent the old "Roosevelt Court." Justice Clark is
the sole Truman appointee who continues to serve.
2 For a review of the changing attitudes of the American Bar Association, see John R.
Schmidhauser, The Warren Court andState Power, a paper presented before the 1959 Annual

Meeting of the American Political Science Association. A useful survey of anti-Court sentiment reflected in recent studies appears in Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Literate
Critics,47 YALE REv. 596 (1958).
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ThE DOCTRiNE OF DFEmNCE
Decisions of the Court during the last twenty years have evidenced a
marked decline, if not a complete demise, of the much-decried standards
which had been applied to test the constitutionality of congressional enactments. The deferential treatment accorded legislative acts and administrative
actions has proceeded to such a point that few limitations of substance continue to exist. This retreat has meant that national powers may be exercised
within a broad range that holds few dangers of transgression of constitutional
boundaries. Relegated to the annals of the past are the once rigid restraints on
economic and social programs imposed by the commerce, taxation, and contract clauses; the non-delegability requirements implicit in the exercise of legislative authority; and the narrow philosophy of government characteristic of
due process interpretations dating from the closing years of the nineteenth
century. 3 With few notable exceptions, the present Court seems inclined to

limit sporadic holdings of unconstitutionality to cases involving the protection
4

of individual liberties.
In all of the controverted areas of the 1930's, there has been a noticeable
tendency to extend to the states the same permissive attitude adopted toward
federal enactments. The bases of decision, to be sure, differ in terms of constitutional principles, but the results are remarkably similar. What has occurred
is the atrophy of the fourteenth amendment in the field of economic regulation. Substantive due process, in the tradition of the Allgeyer-Lochner-AdairCoppages line of reasoning, no longer applies. Admittedly, the Court has not
3 The Court's permissive attitude with respect to the issue of delegability is expressed succinctly in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944): "The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to
base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared
to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate." For an exposition of similar
principles applied to the areas of interstate commerce and taxation, see Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), and United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). An excellent analysis
of the Court's recent approach to economic legislation may be found in Stem, TheProblems
of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process,4 VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951). A good review of
post-1937 trends appears in Krislov, The Supreme Court and the Protection of Economic
Rights, in TBE Por.rIcs OF JuDIciA. REvmw, 1937-1957: A SywosruM 17 (Claunch ed.

1957).
4 The Court recently held unconstitutional several sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as these have been applied to the trial of civilians. United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), effectively removed previous distinctions between capital and non-capital offenses committed by civilian dependents accompanying the armed
forces overseas. The Court also held unconstitutional the peacetime application of a Uniform Code provision for trial by courts martial of civilian employees of the armed services
abroad. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
s Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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repudiated its power to review on the basis of due process claims or, strictly
speaking, on the basis of the contract clause. But such intrusions upon state
power are negligible today. The views expressed by Mr. Justice Stone in the
CaroleneProducts case 6-a case involving federal economic regulation-have
applied in full measure to the states. Stone, in denying a challenge to an act of
Congress as violative of the fifth amendment, adhered to the Holmesian doctrine that "the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators." 7
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion,S even took exception to this
assertion and dissented in the contemporaneous case of Polk Co. v. Glover 9 on
the ground that he would extend both to state and federal economic enactments a conclusive presumption of constitutionality. When, in FederalPower
Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,o Stone repudiated the long-challenged
judicial rule of Smyth v. Ames" in public utility valuation cases, Black, joined
by Douglas and Murphy, objected to the Court's assumption that "regardless
of the terms of the statute, the due process clause of the fifth amendment
grants it power to invalidate an order as unconstitutional because it finds the
charges to be unreasonable." Black, in terms, sought a forthright renunciation
of the existence of any such judicial power:
The doctrine which makes of "due process" an unlimited grant to courts to approve
or reject policies selected by legislatures in accordance with the judges' notion of
reasonableness had its origin in connection with legislative attempts to fix the prices
2
charged by public utilities. And in no field has it had more paralyzing effects.
Theoretically, an argument may be made for the view that the Stone and
Black approaches represent divergencies of opinion pointing to a fundamental
cleavage in the Court's application of the due process clause. In practice, there
is general agreement that due process, in the area of economic regulation, is a
6 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
7 Id. at 152. Steps in the development of the new concept of due process are traced in
WOOD, DUE PRocEss OF LAw, 1932-1949: THE SupRvm CouRT's USE OF A CoNsTrrtrrIONAL
TOOL 103-89 (1951).
8 304 U.S. at 155.
10315 U.S. 575 (1942).

9305 U.S. 5 (1938).
"1169 U.S. 466 (1898).
12 In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Court had interpreted due process to require
that rates, to be valid, must bring a fair return on a fair valuation of property. The Court
abandoned the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames in the instant case, Federal Power Comm'n v.

Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). Mr. Justice Black's criticisms, noted above,
appear in a concurring opinion. Id. at 599, 601. For a critical account of the "fair value" rule
and its development, see HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAw: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE

GOVERNING POwER 461-500 (1952).

56

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 28:53

relic of a constitutional mistake perpetuated in a much-berated past.13 The
Stone formula makes possible judicial intervention, but only an extreme measure would seem capable of translating the potentiality into a reality. Indeed,
more recent due process pronouncements leave little doubt concerning the
expansive scope of state and federal police powers. Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for a unanimous Court in a 1954 urban redevelopment case, rejected
due process claims in sweeping terms:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of
Columbia... or the States legislating concerning local affairs....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are
some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police
power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do
not delimit it.14
The cases cited, and others which could be introduced, serve to establish a
pattern which has become commonplace to observers of the Court's activities
during the last two decades. Out of the turbulence of the 1930's there has
emerged a policy of ostensible self-abnegation which seemingly shifts the balance in the direction of legislative supremacy-federal and state. The invalidation of legislation on constitutional grounds is virtually unknown; instead, on
the face of the decisions, the Court has retreated to a position connoting a role
little more impressive than that of a tribunal of statutory construction. What,
then, is the basis of the antagonisms which have developed toward the presentday Court? Does such emotionalism attach to a body whose functions are
essentially those of an ordinary law court?
The key to this constitutional riddle lies in an understanding of the impact
of recent interpretations bearing upon some of the most sensitive and controversial issues in contemporary society. Strict construction of the Smith Act,
13Criticism of the older due process philosophy is reflected in Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); AFL v. American Sash Co.,
335 U.S. 538 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525 (1949).
14 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Efforts to attack state statutes in the economic
or social field on the basis of equal protection objections have been generally unsuccessful.
See, for example, the Court's refusal to invalidate such measures in Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers
Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959). Although a recent decision, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959), struck down a state regulatory statute as an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, the Court reasserted vigorously its adherence to the broad principle of
deference: "These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in
court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of
them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field .. " Id. at 524.
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for example, has resulted in a concerted effort to secure remedial legislation in
Congress. 15 Corrective measures have been introduced or enacted to counteract the effects of other similarly distasteful decisions reached in the general
area of "civil liberties" on non-constitutional grounds.1 6 But the most vehement opposition to the Court has stemmed from its treatment of federal-state
issues. The Conference of State Chief Justices, meeting in August 1958,
adopted a critical report urging "the desirability of self-restraint on the part of
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the vast powers committed to it."17 The
vote was thirty-six to eight, with two members abstaining and four not present. While the report provides a cursory examination of a broad range of
questions,1S cases involving state anti-subversive statutes, first amendment
guarantees, and the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination are
singled out for special attention. Undoubtedly this document ranks as the
most serious exposition of anti-Court sentiment of the post-World War II era,
considering the unusual tenor of the language employed and the strength of its
appeal to an overwhelming majority of some of the most eminent jurists in the
nation.1 9
Of what validity are the charges leveled by the chief justices? Do they reflect a proper assessment of current strengths and weaknesses in the federal
system? Any effort to answer these questions requires a thoroughgoing inquiry
into and evaluation of the status of present-day federalism in terms of at least
five areas which must be considered basic: preemption; non-economic due
process; federal enforcement of state-created rights; intergovernmental immunities; and state taxing powers and the commerce clause. 20 Each relates to
15 One of the grounds for reversal of convictions against a group of West Coast Communist
leaders related to the construction of the term "organize" in the Smith Act. See Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
16 See, e.g., the majority opinions in Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
17 COMM. REP. ON FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS AS AFFECTED By JuDIcIAL DECISIONS: TENrH
ANNUAL MrrINo OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JusTicEs 23 (1958). An effective reply to the
charges leveled at the Court appears in Lockhart, Comment: A Response to the Conference of
State ChiefJustices, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 802 (1959).
18 The scholarly papers prepared for theCommittee's use appear in a Special Supplement to
the University of Chicago Law Record (December 1958). Several of these papers have been
reprinted: Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of CriminalJustice, 8
DE PAUL L. REv. 213 (1959); Cramton, The Supreme Court and State Power to Deal with
Subversion andLoyalty, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1025 (1959); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause, and in PersonamJurisdictionof State Courts,25 U. CH. L. REv. 569 (1958);
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,and StateJurisdictionover Labor Relations (pts. 1-2),
59 COLUM. L. REv. 6, 269 (1959).
19 The 1959 Conference of State Chief Justices avoided any attack upon the Supreme Court
comparable to the public broadside which characterized the meeting of the previous year.
N.Y. Times, August 24, 1959, p. 11, col. 3.
20 Other important areas of federalism-procedural requirements in state criminal proceedings (particularly as such requirements have been affected by habeas corpus actions before
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doctrines set forth by the Court presumably in the hope of solving problems
which have had divisive effects since the founding of the republic under the
present Constitution. Each, as will be noted, involves venerable principles
readily recognizable despite the introduction of modern embellishments.
PREEMPTION

The doctrine of preemption represents the most controversial of the recent
standards adopted by the Court. Questions of federal supersession of state
legislation arise when Congress, exercising a power not exclusively federal,
acts in an area which the states have entered or may enter. Has Congress,
therefore, "occupied the field" to the exclusion of concurrent state legislation
under the supremacy clause of article VI? There is relatively little difficulty in
deciding such questions when state legislation is repugnant to a federal act,
where a uniform national system of regulation is required, or in areas of
paramount national interest and concern. More nebulous are the points of
concurrence at which a determination of congressional intent is necessary.
Congressional design may manifest itself in the terms of the act itself. But
when such a declaration of purpose is not apparent, the Court must make a
choice on the basis of the available evidence and the standards which a majority considers applicable to the circumstances of the case.
The preemption doctrine traditionally has been developed on the basis of
varying and sometimes inconsistent patterns in the general area of commerce
clause litigation. A classic enunciation of standards may yet be found in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.21 Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the Court in
this early case, set forth a deceptively simple formula:
[T]he power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only
many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the
United States... ; and some... as imperatively demanding that diversity, which
alone can meet the local necessities .... 22
The current standards derive from Mr. Justice Douglas's majority opinion in
ths 1947 case of Rive v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.23 which held that the Federal
Warehouse Act was not merely paramount over state law in the event of conflict but completely superseded it except to the extent that the federal statute
failed to cover the field or made express exceptions in favor of state law. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court formulated and applied a number of
"objective tests" of supersession:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.... Or the
federal courts) and in personam jurisdiction over non-residents-exhibit continuing and
relatively consistent patterns. The work of the Warren Court has not yet contributed any
startling deviations.
21 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1852).
22 Id. at 319.
23 331 U.S. 218.
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Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.... Or the
state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the Federal statute .... 24
The supersedure doctrine was first applied to an area unrelated to the commerce clause or its derivatives more than a decade ago in Hines v. Davidowitz,25
which held unconstitutional a state law requiring the registration of aliens.
At issue was a Pennsylvania act of 1937 which required every alien 18 years of
age or over, with specified exceptions, to register once each year and to comply
with other regulations. In 1940, Congress enacted a Federal Alien Registration
Act which created a different, and less rigorous, code for aliens. Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, held that the federal statute indicated the clear
intention of Congress to establish a "single integrated and all-embracing system" of alien registration. As a consequence, the "states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement,
the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations. ...

."

Any con-

current state power that may exist in this area "is restricted to the narrowest of
limits; the state's power here is not bottomed on the same broad base as is its
power to tax." 26 Stress was placed upon federal supremacy in the general conduct of foreign affairs and the need for a uniform national system. 27
A dramatic application of the preemption doctrine occurred in the 1956
case of Pennsylvania v. Nelson.28 The defendant, an admitted Communist, had
been convicted in a local court on several counts charging violations of the
state's sedition act. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on the narrow issue of supersession of the state law by federal legislation which had "occupied the field."29 The United States Supreme Court, affirming, followed
24Id. at

230. Justice Frankfurter predicted that the Court's decision would open the

"gates of escape from deeply rooted State requirements ... although Congress itself has not
authorized federal authority to take over the regulation of such activities. . . ." Id. at 247
(dissenting opinion).
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
26 Id. at 66-67.
27 Id.at 68. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, attacked the Court's assumption that Congress,
by "occupying the field," had excluded from it all state legislation: "Every act of Congress
occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it
has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution....
The Judiciary of the United States should not assume to strike down a state law which is
immediately concerned with the social order and safety of its people unless the statute plainly
and palpably violates some right granted or secured to the national government by the Constitution or similarly encroaches upon the exercise of some authority delegated to the United
States for the attainment of objects of national concern." Id. at 74.
28 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956). See Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the
Supreme Law of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287 (1957).
29
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
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closely the reasoning of the state court. It held that three federal statutes-the
Smith Act of 1940, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist
Control Act of 1954-had effectively preempted all state programs. Taken as a
whole, they "evince a congressional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for the States to supplement it."30 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a majority, applied in full measure the "tests of
supersession" adapted from the Rice case.
The Court's action seemed to have the effect of invalidating the anti-sedition
statutes of forty-two states, Alaska, and Hawaii. Its sole concession lay in a
statement upholding the right of the states to protect themselves "at any time
against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds."31 However, the Court's
ruling has been narrowed considerably by the recent decision in Uphaus v.
Wyman.32 Mr. Justice Clark, for a majority, held that any interpretation of
Nelson as rendering ineffective state sedition laws "sweeps too broad." He
rejected the notion that the Court had stripped the states of the right to protect
themselves in a broad sense. The opinion emphasized that "a State could
proceed with prosecutions for sedition against the state itself; that it can legiti33
mately investigate in this area follows afortiori."
In recent years, the preemption doctrine has had a disturbing effect in the
field of labor-management relations. The Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,3 4 interpretive of the Wagner Act of 1935, afforded Congress almost unlimited power to regulate labor relations in the United States.
Consequently, the national government came to exercise an authority principally of interest to the states which, prior to the act and the decision, had
been left entirely to state control. But the allocation of control remained a
vexatious question which, in a number of vital areas, led to the creation of a
power vacuum.
Intrusions upon residual state powers in the field of labor relations have
reached their peak in the Warren Court.35 From faltering beginnings in the
30 350 U.S. at 504.

31 350 U.S. at 500.

32 360 U.S. 72 (1959).

33 Justice Clark limited the scope of supersession to Chief Justice Warren's opening statement in Nelson: "The 'precise holding of the court (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania), and all
that is before us for review, is that the Smith Act... supersedes the enforceability of the
Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribed the same conduct."'" 360 U.S. at 76. (Emphasis
supplied by the Court, quoting from Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 499 (1956)).
34 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35 Justice Frankfurter protested against this trend during the early, developmental years:
"Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the farreaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to
achieve the supersession of State authority... Any indulgence in construction should be in
favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to
assure full federal authority, completely displacing the States." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947). He reiterated this admonition,
in almost identical language, as a part of a dissenting opinion in a non-labor case decided
some twelve years later. Farmers Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 540-41 (1959).
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immediate post-World War II period, the tendency to deny state jurisdiction
continued to expand and, in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,36 a new extreme in supersedure was attained. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a
majority of the Court, ruled that a state labor relations board does not acquire
jurisdiction merely because the National Labor Relations Board, by reference
to its own standards, refuses to assert the authority presumably conferred by
Congress. The national government has preempted the field and only an explicit cession of power by the national board-under a section of law never
utilized-will serve to remedy the existing void. A no-man's-land has resulted,
but the Court recognizes no alternative: "Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress' power in the area of commerce
among the States is plenary, its judgment must be respected whatever policy
objections there may be to creation of a no-man's-land."3 7 Two more recent
cases seemed to indicate a changing attitude on the part of the Court-a realization that the doctrine of Guss had carried preemption to well-nigh disastrous
heights.38 Nevertheless, its application in less compelling circumstances-that
is, where an urgent power void is not created-appears to have become
fixed.39
A recent "landmark" case, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,40
reasserted principles previously formulated and, in many respects, extended
the scope of the rationale which underlay the long series of decisions in the
area of labor preemption. At issue was the question whether a state court had
jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful union activity which it
was precluded from enjoining on the basis of the decision in Guss. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the Court and departing from his traditionally cautious approach to the doctrine of preemption, held that the state's jurisdiction
had been wholly displaced. The ostensible form of the preventive relief-a
remedy defined by the traditional law of torts-was deemed not controlling
since "even the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme." 41 State jurisdiction
could prevail only when there were evidences of conduct marked by violence
and imminent threats to the public order. Frankfurter stressed the need for
deference to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board
36 353 U.S. 1 (1957). A review of earlier cases appears in Cox & Seidman, Federalismand
Labor Relations,64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950).
37 353 U.S. at 10, 11.
38 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
3
9 Hotel Employees v. Sax Enterprises, 358 U.S. 270 (1959); Teamsters Union v. Oliver,
358 U.S. 283 (1959).
40 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
41
Id. at 247.
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when an activity was arguably subject to the provisions of the federal statute.
He conceded that state submission to the primary jurisdiction of the National
Board did not ensure Board adjudication of the status of a disputed activity.
In fact, he intimated, the states may even be powerless to act when the activities are clearly "neither protected nor prohibited" under federal law.42 Should
such an extension of the preemption doctrine come to pass, Justice Harlan
warned in a concurring opinion, "then indeed state power to redress wrongful
acts in the labor field will be reduced to the vanishing point."423
NoN-EcoNOMIc Dun PROCESS
The Court has applied the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
in several areas related to state civil proceedings. Aside from the controversial
segregation issue which, despite its political implications, bears little direct
relation to the development of the present-day concept of due process, 43 the
recent cases fall into three categories: dismissals of public employees; deprivations of professional or vocational status; and disqualifications for public
benefits.
In general, the Court has upheld loyalty-oath requirements as requisite to
the holding of positions alleged to be "sensitive." However, it has placed procedural safeguards about the public employee where the state seeks to effect
his dismissal. In the much-discussed case of Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education44the Court held that the summary dismissal of an employee because
of his invocation of the fifth amendment before a legislative investigating committee was arbitrary and resulted in a denial of due process of law. Previously,
in Wieman v. Updegraff,45 the Court had condemned as an "assertion of arbitrary power," violative of due process, a state's efforts "to exclude persons
solely on the basis of organizational membership, regardless of their knowl46
edge concerning the organizations to which they had belonged."
The Court has extended the protection of the due process clause to deprivations of professional status by state agencies. Such intervention has been most
pronounced with respect to state denials of admission to the bar of candidates whose previous records disclosed subversive affiliations. Schware v.
42Id. at 246.
42a Id. at 254.
43
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), representing the culmination of a
long series of public education cases, was decided on the basis of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case
relating to the segregation issue in the District of Columbia, by implication fused the due
process and equal protection concepts: "The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at 499.
- 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
45 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
46 Id. at 190-91.
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Board of Bar Examiners47 presented the question whether a state could deny
an applicant permission to take a bar examination solely on the basis of its
interpretation of what constitutes good moral character. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Black, found nothing in the record which suggested that
Schware had engaged in any conduct which reflected adversely on his character. Instead, it held that New Mexico had deprived him of due process in
denying him the opportunity to qualify for the practice of law. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Clark and Harlan,
refused to concede that it was the Court's function to act as overseer of a particular result of the procedure established by a state for admission to its bar.
Nevertheless, he agreed with the majority on the narrow ground that the significance accorded Schware's early affiliations was a consideration offensive to
48
due process.
Konigsberg v. State Bar4 9-the most controversial of these cases-raised the
issue whether a state committee of bar examiners could refuse to certify
Konigsberg on the ground that he failed to prove good moral character and
non-advocacy of the overthrow of the federal or state governments by unconstitutional means. In this instance, the applicant had refused, on the basis of
alleged assertions of privilege grounded on the first and fourteenth amendments, to answer questions concerning his present and past membership in the
Communist Party. Mr. Justice Black, writing for a bare majority of five, held
that the exclusion violated due process since there was no evidence in the
record which rationally justified the findings in the state court. The state,
Black concluded, could not exercise its power "in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association." 50 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented from the majority holding on the merits. In a bristling opinion, he
charged that the Court was acting as a "super state court of appeals" in attempting "to impose on California its own notions of public policy and judgment.... today's decision represents an unacceptable intrusion into a matter
of state concern." 51
A wholly new area, comprising disqualifications for public benefits, was
recently added. This extension of due process safeguards has been occasioned
by an increasingly large number of state statutes requiring a loyalty oath as a
condition of eligibility for tax exemptions, unemployment insurance, and low47 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
49 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
48 Id.at 250-51.
so Id.at 273.
51Id.at 312. Subsequent decisions in Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399
(1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); and Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362
U.S. 1 (1960), have compromised the effectiveness of the holdings in Konigsberg and Slochower. Collaterally, the Court, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), decried a
state's inquiry into the political beliefs of a university professor. It held that his contempt
conviction violated due process requirements. The broad scope of the ruling in Sweezy was
narrowed, if not overruled, in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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cost housing. During the 1957 Term, the Court had its first opportunity to
examine such statutes in Speiser v. Randall52 and First Unitarian Church v.
County ofLos Angeles.53 In both cases, the Court was confronted with constitutional and statutory requirements that tax exemptions be denied to persons
who advocate the unlawful overthrow of the government by force or who
would support a foreign power engaged in hostilities with the United States.
Claimants had to sign a statement on the tax return certifying non-engagement in the proscribed advocacy. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the prevailing
opinion for the Court without reaching the question of the validity of the
state constitutional provision. Instead, he held that the implementing statute
denied freedom of speech without due process safeguards "through procedures
which place the burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayer.. .. "54
Mr. Justice Black, concurring, termed the levy "a tax on belief and expression ... a palpable violation of the First Amendment."55 Mr. Justice Douglas, expressing substantial agreement with the majority opinion, averred that
enforcement of the condemned-statute would have enabled the state government to become a "monitor of thought."56
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF STATE-CREATED RIGHTS

State Law, Diversity, and the Erie Doctrine
Perplexing problems of federal-state relations continue to stem from the
Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 57 Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking
for a majority in this famous case, abandoned the century-old doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson58 that the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases were
free to exercise an independent judgment in fashioning a federal common law
applicable to the adjudication of state-created rights. In Erie the Court held
that judicial decisions, like statutory law, were "the laws of the several states"
within the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act. The shattering of the "general
law" philosophy of Swift v. Tyson imposed a responsibility upon the federal
courts, and ultimately upon the Supreme Court, to formulate methods of accommodation attuned to the new approach. Two decades have supplied some
of the answers but, within the context of the American federal system, many
and varied problems remain.5 9
On balance, the Warren Court has been receptive to an expansion of statelaw applications in diversity cases although a majority has not sought to enlarge substantially upon the potential implicit in the Erie doctrine. Justice
52 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
53 357 U.S. 545 (1958).

5

54 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
55Id. at 529-30.

57 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

59

6 Id. at 538.

See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435

(1953); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958).
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Frankfurter suggested in 1954 that steps be taken to terminate the "mounting
mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction." 60 The subject-matter of diversity cases is essentially state litigation and, in his view, "little excuse is left for diversity jurisdiction now that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins... has put a stop to the unwarranted
freedom of federal courts to fashion rules of local law in defiance of local
law." 61 Undoubtedly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sentiments, bluntly stated, are
shared by other members of the Court. The increasingly heavy burden placed
upon the federal judiciary in diversity actions is unmistakable. But the Court
is not prepared to surrender all aspects of federal supervision arising out of the
diversity relationship.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.62 the Court reaffirmed the outcome-determinative concept by refusing to draw rigid distinctions between substance and
procedure in relation to the application of the Erie doctrine. It reversed a
holding by the court of appeals that the arbitration provision of an employment contract was procedural and, therefore, governed by federal rather than
state law. Mr. Justice Douglas followed the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York63 that a federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case
was "only another court of the State." The heart of the Erie doctrine, as the
majority interpreted it, was that the choice of a forum-federal or stateshould not be permitted to lead to a substantively different result. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring, pointed out that the "differences between arbitral
and judicial determination of a controversy under a contract sufficiently go to
the merits of the outcome, and not merely because of the contingencies of different individuals passing on the same question, to make the matter one of
'substance' in the sense relevant for Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." 64
A more recent case, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 65 casts serious
doubt upon the vitality of the holding in Bernhardt.In effect, it belies assumptions that the substantive-procedural dichotomy has been solved and that continued federal intrusion in diversity cases derives solely from the constitutional requirement. Byrd arose from a diversity action instituted in a federal
court by an employee claiming damages allegedly sustained as a result of
negligence where benefits had previously been provided for under the South
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law. The company interposed the state
law as its defense on the ground that the statute was the sole remedy available.
The Court, in remanding, directed that the factual issue of the employee's inclusion within the terms of the statute be decided by a jury, although South
60 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (concurring opinion).
61Id. at 56.
62 350 U.S. 198 (1956).

63 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 207-08 (1956).
65356 U.S. 525 (1958).
64
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Carolina decisions on this point vested the determination of such questions in
a judge. In reviewing the post-Erie cases, there is no indication that the Court
considered Bernhardt to be controlling. The outcome-determinative test was
modified by the adoption of a formula founded upon a weighing of interests
between state practice on the one hand and "affirmative countervailing considerations" of federal policy on the other.66 Significantly, the Court reasserted
the distinctive character of diversity jurisdiction as a part of an "independent
system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction." It cited with approval the pre-Erie decision of Herron v. Southern Pac.
Co.67 which held that state statutes and constitutional provisions could not
68
alter the essential nature or function of a federal court.
A series of cases decided during the 1958 Term have revealed cleavages
with respect to the application of the doctrine of equitable abstention in the
exercise of diversity jurisdiction. The doctrine was formulated initially as a
judicial device to sanction the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions on the assumption that a prior resolution of pertinent state law questions, in the absence of a settled body of decisional law, might obviate the need
for further adjudication.69 Subsequently, the Court expanded the doctrine to
include postponement on grounds of comity with the states where state administrative processes might be disrupted or where needless friction in federalstate relationships might result. The extent to which the abstention doctrine
has been applied reflects, in large measure, a conscious effort on the part of the
federal courts to reduce competition between the federal and state judicial
systems. This self-imposed restraint on the exercise of jurisdiction is a part of
the general doctrine of deference and, undoubtedly, stems from similar policy
considerations.
In two eminent domain cases based upon diversity of citizenship, the Court
reached opposite conclusions concerning the proper application of the doctrine of equitable abstention. In LouisianaPower & Light Co. v. City of Thibo66
Justice Brennan, for the majority, posed the question ".. . whether the federal policy
favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest
of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal
court and another way in the state court." Id. at 538. See 43 MnqN. L. REv. 580 (1959).
67 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
68 Compare Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273 (1959), another diversity proceeding, in which the Court applied the Byrd doctrine to an action for recovery for wrongful
death. Justice Clark, speaking for a majority, held that, in a federal court, all disputed issues
of fact necessary to a determination of the decedent's status within the meaning of the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act had to be submitted to a jury regardless of the
practice in the state courts. Justice Harlan, dissenting, contended that a retrial would be
justified under Byrd only if the state's practice treating factual issues under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as for the court, instead of for the jury, "is merely a 'form and mode'
of procedure rather than 'an integral part' of the rights created by the Act." Id. at 286.
69 For an early statement of the doctrine, see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941). A recent survey of applicable cases appears in Note, JudicialAbstention from the
-Exercise of FederalJurisdiction,59 COLuM. L. REv. 749 (1959).

1960]

THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM

7

67

daux Othe Court sustained a stay of proceedings by the district court to afford
an opportunity for state construction of a statute hitherto judicially uninterpreted. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion, stressed that
application of the doctrine reflected a "deeper policy derived from our federalism." He pointed out that a differentiating characteristic of eminent domain
was its intimate involvement with sovereign prerogative. Hence, since a determination of the nature of the delegation of the power of eminent domain
affects the apportionment of governmental powers between state and local
units, there is need to avoid "the hazards of serious disruption by federal
courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities."71 The second, County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,7 2 was
distinguished on the ground that the controlling state decisional law was clear
and factual issues alone had to be resolved. Mr. Justice Brennan, author of a
dissenting opinion in LouisianaPower & Light Co. and of the majority opinion
in Mashuda, rejected contentions previously expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter that a state's power of eminent domain was so "mystically involved
with 'sovereign prerogative'" as to justify abstention.
Harrisonv. NAACP,73 another in the series, was instituted on the basis of
diversity, the civil rights statutes, and the presence of a federal question. Mr.
Justice Harlan, speaking for a majority, once again applied the abstention doctrine to stay the hand of the district court in passing upon the constitutionality
of five Virginia statutes enacted in 1956 as segments of the state's general plan
of "massive resistance" against desegregation. Postponement, the Court made
plain, was not intended to intimate any determination with respect to the
validity of the acts. The sole purpose was to facilitate a federal judgment based
on "something that is a complete product of the state, the enactment as
phrased by its legislature and as construed by its highest court." 74 Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Harrison, denounced the Court's action as a step tending to dilute the stature of the federal district courts "making them secondary
tribunals in the administration of justice under the Federal Constitution" despite the fact that, in his view, any reasons for showing deference to local institutions had vanished.75 In Martin v. Creasy, 76 a state condemnation proceeding, Douglas took exception to what he termed a growing trend toward "the
judicial intolerance of diversity jurisdiction." The Court's approach, he contended, appeared to be spreading to other aspects of federal jurisdiction and, in
effect, negating the responsibility of the federal courts for the exposition of
federal law.77
While the recent cases suggest that the doctrine of equitable abstention may
70 360 U.s. 25 (1959).
71 Id. at 28.
72 360 U.S. 185 (1959).

74 Id. at 178.

73 360 U.S. 167 (1959).

77 Id. at 228.

75

76

Id. at 180.
360 U.S. 219 (1959).

68

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:53

well have attained a high level of acceptability, possible extensions remain
uncertain. Undoubtedly, cases predicated principally upon diversity will continue to be treated with deference to local authority on the assumption that, in
reality, they are state rather than federal proceedings. 7 8 There is unanimity
among the members of the Court that the exercise of the diversity power may
79
be "so utterly disruptive of federal-state relations as to make it undesirable."
However, when diversity is combined with some aspect of federal question
jurisdiction, the future of the abstention doctrine holds less promise. In cases
arising from civil rights violations, for example, the federal courts have not
been inclined to apply the abstention doctrine consistently. Instead, they have
followed a somewhat sporadic course of discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction only when proper remedies appear to be available in the state courts.8 0
Application of State Law in Federal Question Cases
Initially, the Erie doctrine was limited to cases arising from the diverse citizenship of the parties. However, by congressional action and by judicial interpretation, aspects of Erie have been extended to the broader area of federal
question jurisdiction. In a number of instances, the adoption of state law by
Congress had been a pragmatic device designed to fill a void created by the
lack of a readily available body of federal law. Since 1825, for example, resort
has been made to state criminal laws for the punishment of crimes committed
within federal enclaves and not otherwise proscribed. More recently Congress
has made state law expressly applicable in actions instituted under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. In varying degrees, judicial decisions have extended recourse
to state law as a basis for the determination of rights and obligations in admiralty, in proceedings involving federal taxation, and in litigation relating to
government bonds and other commercial paper. Where the outcome of a federal question case has been dependent upon judicial construction of legislative
intent, the utilization of state law represents a knowing effort to ensure state
participation in a working federalism-an effort akin to the post-1937 turnabout in the interpretation of the due process clause.
Successive assimilative crimes acts provide one of the earliest and, perhaps,
the most enduring areas of federal competence in which state law has been
made applicable. Since the first decades of the nineteenth century, Congress
78 See, e.g., City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959);
Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957);
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
79 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 228 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). While
Justice Douglas appears to agree that extremes in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction may
have adverse effects on a working federalism, he has refused to forego federal supervision in
a number of critical areas. For a recent exposition of his views see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (1960).
8
0 Refusals to abstain have been common in school segregation litigation. E.g., Romero
v. Weakley, 131 F.Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1955), reversed,226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955). But see
Bryan v. Austin, 148 F.Supp. 563 (E.D.S.C.), vacated as moot, 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
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has chosen to utilize the criminal statutes of the states for the punishment of
offenses perpetrated within federal enclaves. 8 ' Prior to the amendments introduced in 1948, the statutes generally provided for the application of state laws
in force "now" and at the time of the commission of the offense. The 1948 act
omitted the "now in force" stipulation and substituted the provision "in force
3
at the time of such act or omission." 8 2 At issue in United States v. Sharpnack8
-the principal case in this area to come before the Warren Court-was the
application of a state criminal statute in force when the crime was committed,
but not effective at the time of passage of the Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948.
The act was challenged as an invalid delegation of legislative power to the
states and as an abdication on the part of Congress of essential federal functions. The Court rejected allegations of non-delegability and held that the
federal policy constituted a continuing process of adoption by Congress for
federal enclaves of unpreempted state offenses and punishments.
State law also plays a vital role in adjudications under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The statute permits claims against the government under circumstances where the United States, "if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 84 The Warren Court has reduced the scope of state-law applications principally as a means of broadening the liability of the United States.
For example, federal liability for tortious conduct does not cease merely because local law immunizes public bodies from such liability.85 The Court also
has held that, in specified circumstances, damages are not limited to the maxi86
mum recoverable under state law.
The exercise of admiralty powers has presented special problems in several
cases which have come before the Warren Court. In Madruga v. Superior
Court,8 7 the Court upheld the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts to
order partition of ships against claims that proceedings of this character
were within the exclusive domain of the federal courts. Mr. Justice Black,
81 It is settled that state acts cannot operate to enlarge or otherwise modify definitions of
crimes explicitly provided for in the federal criminal code. Williams v. United States, 327
U.S. 711 (1946).
82 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
83 355 U.S. 286 (1958). See Note, The FederalAssimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARv. L. REv.
685 (1957).
84 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
85 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
86 The question related to the interpretation of a 1947 amendment to the federal act providing that where the law of the place permits "damages only punitive in nature," the
United States should be liable for "actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958), as construed in
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956).
87 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
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speaking for seven members of the Court, construed broadly the so-called
saving clause in admiralty which reserves to suitors "in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."8 8 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's
Fund Ins. Co.89 presented the question whether state or federal law governed
the validity and scope of warranties in a marine insurance contract dispute.
The Court held that, in the absence of an established federal admiralty rule,
state law was applicable; it rejected suggestions that controlling federal rules
should be formulated.90
Where, in Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell,9 1 a question arose with respect to litigation involving government bonds, the Court
once again held that state law was controlling. At issue was an action to recover the value of bearer bonds issued by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation and allegedly stolen and cashed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
Court, rejected contentions that a "federal law merchant" was applicable to
all transactions involving the commercial paper of the United States. The
Clearfielddoctrine92 was affirmed; that is, federal law was held to govern the
88 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
89 348 U.S. 310 (1955). See MacChesney, Marine Insurance and the Substantive Admiralty Law, 57 MICH. L. REv. 555 (1959).
90
In The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), the application of state law was upheld in an admiralty proceeding to determine rights arising from death in state territorial
waters. Despite the fact that the statute, in the circumstances peculiar to this case, had not
been construed authoritatively by the state courts, the Court declined to apply the doctrine
of equitable abstention. Accord, United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n
v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959). Compare Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 623 (1959), where injury occurred aboard a ship upon navigable waters.
See also Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361
U.S. 340 (1960).
In another recent case a purported clash between two types of remedies-the one available under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the other
under a state workmen's compensation statute-was resolved in favor of the state. The
Court held that a waterfront employee whose injury had occurred within the "twilight zone"
of the federal act's coverage could elect to base recovery either on the federal lav or on
negligence action under the state act. Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S.
272 (1959). See Note, Admiralty-"TwilightZone" in Workmen's Compensation-PursuitoJ
State Common Law Action Against Employer, 57 MicH. L. Rav. 1241 (1959).
91 352 U.S. 29 (1956).

92 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In the Clearfieldcase, suit
was instituted by the United States against a Pennsylvania bank which had accepted a government check upon a forged endorsement and made collection from the United States. The
district court ruled that the rights of the parties were to be determined by the law of Pennsylvania and that since the United States unreasonably delayed in giving notice of the forgery
to the bank it was barred from recovery under applicable state precedents. The Supreme
Court, affirming the court of appeals in its reversal of the district court's disposition of the
case, held that Erie was inapplicable, that legal questions involved in controversies over
commercial paper issued by the United States must be resolved by resort to federal rather
than local law, and that, in the absence of a controlling act of Congress, federal courts were
required to fashion the governing rules. For applications of the Clearfield doctrine, see
National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Priebe & Sons v. United
States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947).
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interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations. 93 Parnellwas distinguished as "purely between private parties" and not touching the "rights and
94
duties of the United States."
State law has served on numerous occasions as an essential component of
federal tax determinations. In two cases decided in 1958 the Court affirmed the
application of state law as a basis for the determination of the substantive
liability of a taxpayer's widow who, as transferee of her husband's property,
had been assessed for his unpaid income tax deficiencies. Mr. Justice Brennan,
writing for a majority, rejected contentions that a body of federal decisional
law should be created and applied to establish the existence and extent of liability. "That effort is plainly not justified," he held, "when there exists a
flexible body of pertinent state law continuously being adapted to changing
circumstances affecting all creditors." 95 Once again, in the absence of an express congressional mandate to the contrary, the Court followed Erie on the
assumption that "uniformity is not always the federal policy."
A notable exception to the generally consistent trend favoring state-law
applications occurred in the controversial case of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills.96 At issue was the application of Section 301 of the TaftHartley Act which provides that suits for breach of collective bargaining
agreements may be instituted in the federal district courts without regard to
the usual diversity requirements. 97 A labor union in this instance had sought
specific performance of an arbitration clause. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, held that the statute was not merely jurisdictional but authorized
the federal courts to formulate a body of substantive law in this area. "The
range of judicial inventiveness," Justice Douglas averred, "will be determined
by the nature of the problem." But federal interpretation of the federal law
98
will prevail.
93 A recent case, United States v. 93.970 Acres, 360 U.S. 328 (1959), reaffirms the principle that where "essential interests of the Federal Government are concerned, federal law
rules unless Congress chooses to make state laws applicable."
94 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956). Justices
Black and Douglas, dissenting, called for the application of a uniform federal law. Id. at 35.
95 Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), and a companion case, United States v.
Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). See Note, The Role of State Law in FederalTax Determinations,72
HARv. L. REV. 1350 (1959). In Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), and United
States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960), the threshold question was whether and
to what extent a defaulting taxpayer had property rights to which a federal lien could attach.
In resolving this issue, the Court held, the nature and extent of the property rights had to be
ascertained under state law in accordance with the ruling in Bess. In United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), the Court sanctioned the adoption as federal law of state law governing divestiture of federal tax liens on the assumption that "the need for uniformity in this
instance is outweighed by the severe dislocation to local property relationships which would
result from our disregarding state procedures." Id. at 242.
96 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
97 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
98 353 U.S. at 457.
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Despite strong overtones of federal preemption, there is no explicit indication that state jurisdiction is completely precluded. Compatible state law, the
Court has declared, "may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best
effectuate the federal policy.... Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private
rights." 99 In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice
Harlan, rejected the contention of the majority that the substantive law to be
applied was federal law. Instead he interpreted section 301 as a congressional
grant to the federal courts of "protective jurisdiction" alone. State law, therefore, would apply supplemented, where necessary, by federal remedial law.100
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, denied that the law directed the courts to
fashion a "federal common law of labor contracts." In his view, section 301
was merely a jurisdictional statute which exceeded the scope of permissible
judicial power that might be exercised under article III of the Constitution.101
The application of state law in federal question cases-to a far greater extent than in diversity proceedings-will be a recurring and important problem
in the development of federalism. Here the Court is not confronted with the
essential artificiality of a federal adjudication where state issues are exclusive
or at least paramount. Instead, it must come to grips with the hard-core elements of cases arising under the Constitution, the federal statutes, or the
administrative regulations of national agencies. State law underlies many questions which require determination in a variety of such contexts. Generally,
there has been a tendency to avoid recourse to state procedural rules in federal
question litigation although the influence of Erie on substantive matters has
02
been widespread.1
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES AND STATE POWER

Doctrines of intergovernmental immunity have been developed on an ad
hoe basis in the form ofjudicially erected rules designed, presumably, to avoid
the potentialities of friction implicit in federalism. Specific clauses of the Constitution have been invoked, if at all, either indirectly or sporadically. Historically, the immunity doctrine first appeared in the famous case of McCul99
Professor Meltzer, assessing the impact of the Court's decision in Lincoln Mills, suggests that the reverse of the problems arising from the Erie doctrine in the federal judiciary
may be transferred to the state courts. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State
Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 269 (1959). See also Bickel &
Wellington, LegislativePurposeandthe JudicialProcess:The Lincoln Mills Case,71 HARV. L.
Rev. 1 (1957).
100 353 U.S. at 460.
101 Id. at 466 & 469. The choice-of-law issue had remained in doubt following an earlier

ruling in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955). Justice Frankfurter, announcing the judgment of the Court and an opinion
in which Justices Burton and Minton joined, construed section 301 as a mere procedural
provision affording a federal forum for state law.
102 See Hill, StateProceduralLaw in FederalNondiversityLitigation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 66

(1955).
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loch v. MarylandlO3as a means of protecting the activities of federal instrumentalities from interference by the states. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, deriving
his argument in part from the supremacy clause, held unconstitutional the
imposition by Maryland of a tax upon a branch office of the Bank of the
United States, a federal agency incorporated by Congress in 1816. From these
early beginnings, the cloak of immunity was extended to exempt the salaries of
federal and state officers from taxation by an "alien" sovereign. 104 Immunity
reached its high point in the Court of the 1920's and early 1930's. The prevailing trend was reversed, however, in a series of cases decided in 1938 and subsequent years. Of great importance was the destruction of the reciprocal exemption of state and federal employees from income taxation 05 followed, in
the mid-1940's, by reaffirmation of the principle that immunity could not be
applied to the performance of non-essential state functions.106 As a consequence, the immunity doctrine no longer had to be taken as a substantial
limitation on the federal taxing power although the scope of state authority to
tax federally related activities was not made equally broad.
A long-standing and continuing issue in the area of intergovernmental immunities relates to state taxation of federal contractors and lessees. The 1941
case of Alabama v. King & Boozer10 7 established the principle that a tax was
not rendered invalid by the fact that its economic burden ultimately had to be
borne by the government. However, the validity of this doctrine was seriously
compromised when the Court, some thirteen years later, held in KernLimerick, Inc. v. ScurlocklOS that a state's gross receipts tax law could not be
applied to purchases by a private contractor designated by the Navy Department to act as its purchasing agent. King & Boozer was distinguished on the
ground that "though the Government also bore the economic burden of the
state tax in that case, the legal incidence of that tax was held to fall on the
independent contractor and not upon the United States." 109 By contrast, the
Court ruled, the state in Kern-Limerick actually was levying a tax on an instrumentality of the United States, which was not permissible in the absence of
express consent by Congress.
The decision in Kern-Limerick created much consternation among state and

local officials. Remedial legislation was introduced in Congress to eliminate
claims of immunity from such taxes by contractors performing work for and
103 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARMnTs IN
CONSTrTUTONAL INTERPRETATION 88 (1956).

104 Dobbins v. Comm'rs of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842); Collector v. Day,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). The doctrine was considerably enlarged in Pollock v. Farmers'

Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
105 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).

106 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), affirmed the doctrine established in
the 1905 case of South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
107 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
108 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
109 Id.at 122.
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acting as agents of the federal government. Hearings were held before a subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee in 1957.110 However, the effort seemed pointless when, in the spring of 1958, the Court decided
several cases which, on different bases, seemed to portend a return to standards more favorable to the exercise of state taxing powers.
Three cases-UnitedStates v. City of Detroit,111 United States v. Township
of Muskegon,112 and City of Detroitv. Murray Corp. ofAmerical' 3 -effectively
destroyed tenuous distinctions in the area of immunity between privilege and
property taxes. Earlier decisions had upheld the constitutionality of state
privilege taxes upon the value of federal property in private hands. However,
the Court, in United States v. County of Alleghenyn 4 had condemned an ad
valorem tax on the property itself on the assumption that "Governmentowned property, to the full extent of the Government's interest therein, is
immune from taxation, either as against the Government itself or as against
5
one who holds it as a bailee."11
Has the Court broken new ground in the 1958 Michigan cases pointing
toward the further extension of limitations upon federal immunity from state
taxation? If United States v. City of Detroit and United States v. Township of
Muskegon are considered alone, the taxes imposed undoubtedly are reconcilable with the letter, if not the spirit, of Allegheny. Detroit presented the
question of the constitutionality of a Michigan statute which subjected to
taxation otherwise exempt real property being used by a private party as a
lessee of the United States in a business conducted for profit. Muskegon posed
the same basic issues with the factual difference that the taxpayer held under a
permit rather than a lease and that the property was being used in the performance of government contracts on a rent-free basis. In both cases, a majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, argued effectively that the taxes
imposed were for the beneficial use of property, as distinguished from levies
on the property itself. Neither the lessee nor the permit holder, the Court held,
was "so assimilated by the Government as to become one of its constituent
6
parts.""1
110 Hearings on S. 6 before a Subcommittee on the Elimination of Claims of Immunity
from State andLocal Taxes of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957). The principal measure under consideration was passed by the Senate in
March 1958. 104 CoNG. REc. 3363 (1958).
M 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
112 355 U.S. 484 (1958).

114 322 U.S. 174 (1944).

113 355 U.S. 489 (1958).

I's Id. at 189.

116 355 U.S. at 486. In Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 (1956), the
Court affirmed the imposition of state personal property taxes upon a government lessee
who was providing housing accommodations on an Air Force base in Nebraska. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for a majority, denied contentions that the Military Leasing Act of 1947
and the Wherry Military Housing Act of 1949, taken together, conferred a status akin to
that of a managing agent upon the lessee corporation and thereby clothed it with immunity.
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A more striking deviation from previous standards-a departure so marked
as to represent, in effect, the overruling of Allegheny-is discernible in City of
Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America." 7 At issue was the constitutionality of
state taxes levied, in part, on the value of materials and work in process being
held by a government subcontractor but to which the United States had legal
title. The applicable Michigan statutes characterized the taxes as assessments
against property rather than privilege or use taxes. Indeed, the pleadings had
formally admitted allegations that one of the levies was an ad valorem tax on
personal property. The Court, however, found that the practical effects of the
taxes in question were identical to those upheld in the two companion cases on
the assumption that there is "no essential difference so far as constitutional
tax immunity is concerned between taxing a person for using property he possesses and taxing him for possessing property he uses when in both instances
he uses the property for his own private ends."" 8
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in separate opinions, expressed agreement
with the majority view in Detroit and Muskegon that the lessee's and user's
taxes, construed by the state courts to be levies on the privilege of using taxexempt property, fell within acceptable constitutional bounds. Both objected,
however, to the Court's holding in Murray which, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
view, "would outright reject the doctrine of constitutional immunity from
taxation of the Government and its property."" 9 Mr. Justice Whittaker, who
wrote a dissenting opinion in each of the three Michigan cases, prepared a particularly cogent and carefully reasoned attack upon the Court's approach in
Murray.120
The permissiveness of the Court's declarations in the area of taxation does
not mean that federal immunities have been abandoned on a general basis.
Indeed, on the very day of decision in the Michigan cases, the Court, in Public
Util. Comm'n v. United States,121 reaffirmed and extended traditional immunity doctrines deriving from the supremacy clause of the Constitution. The
Government, in a suit for declaratory relief, had sought a ruling that a California statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited carriers
from transporting Government property at rates other than those approved
by a state commission. Mr. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, shunted
aside the contractor cases "as their impact at most is to increase the costs of
the operation."1 22 Instead, the Court focused on what it concluded was a constitutionally fatal conflict between the federal policy of negotiated rates, reflected in the procurement statutes and rules, and the state policy of regulation. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined in a dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Burton, charged that the Court had acted prematurely
117

355 U.S. 489 (1958).
at 493.

120 Id. at 511.

118 Id.

121

119 Id. at 502.

122 Id.at 543.

355 U.S. 534 (1958).
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in passing on the issue of constitutionality without requiring the government
to proceed through the state commission in the first instance. He objected to
the extreme character of the majority opinion and, citing Murray in particular, found it anomalous that "the very Term which witnesses a further diminution of the doctrine of implied intergovernmental tax immunities should produce this decision."123
Viewed in retrospect, the emerging pattern of intergovernmental immunities reveals seemingly incongruous elements which make it less decisive than
that which has developed in other areas of present-day federalism. The Warren
Court, on the one hand, has avoided the sacrifice of essential spheres of federal
supremacy to regulatory inroads by the states. If Public Util. Comm'n serves
as an index, the Court has shown such zeal in the protection of federal activities from state intrusions as to raise serious questions of anticipatory adjudication under the guise of the declaratory judgment procedure. But, at the same
time, the Court has accepted the general doctrine of deference as its dominant
motif. This theme is expressed most forcefully in the recent contractor cases
although Murray,representing a true break with precedent, remains the exception and not the rule. The Court's intent, fundamentally, is confined to placing
the stamp of constitutionality on state efforts to realize revenues from private
enterprises which seek federal immunity while engaging in profit-making ventures. There does not appear to be any inclination to yield ground with respect
24
to the taxation of other federally related instrumentalities or functions.1
Tin

COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXING POWER

The exercise of taxing power by the states, within the constitutional context
provided by the commerce clause, touches upon one of the most sensitive
components of modern federalism. Theoretically, at least, the immunity of
interstate commerce from direct interference has long been accepted as a guiding principle of federal-state relations.125 In the area of multistate taxation, the
123 Id. at 552. Traditional immunities, not grounded on tax considerations, continue to
serve as a judicial buffer against possible state intrusions upon the performance of essential
federal functions. See, e.g., Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956), in which the
Court struck down efforts to subject a federal contractor to state licensing requirements. The
rationale of Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) was followed. For an analysis of
related questions governed by the law of legislative jurisdiction, see the Report of the InterdepartmentalCommittee for the Study of JurisdictionOver FederalAreas Within the States
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956-57).
124 For example, the Court has refused to sustain an Ohio tax levied against mutual savings banks on the ground that the property values on which the tax was computed included
United States bonds. Society for Sav. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955). The Court also has
struck down as discriminatory a Texas tax upon a lessee of real property owned by the
United States where businesses with similar state leases are not taxed. Phillips Chemical Co.
v. Dumas School Dist. 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
125 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946),
rejected"the notion that a State may be allowed one single-tax-worth of direct interference
with the free flow of commerce. An exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not
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inclusiveness of the commerce rule often is merged with due process requirements based upon the attainment of a taxable situs within the state imposing
the levy. The two constitutional concepts, applied separately or fused, represent a formidable basis for the invalidation of state tax laws. Their effectiveness, however, has been undermined by the Court's recent adoption of a generally deferential pattern looking toward the minimization or removal ofjudicial interference in the economic policies of the states. To be sure, practical
considerations, stemming from the unending search by the states for additional
126
sources of revenue, have continued to provide a cogent impetus.
Implicit in the adjudication of state taxation cases are recurring political
and economic issues which cannot be obscured by elaborate displays of constitutional legalism. In each instance, the Court must balance anew competing
demands for the preservation of state fiscal autonomy against the need for the
maintenance of a free trade community throughout the nation. To what extent
are such goals compatible or mutually exclusive? How best is an accommodation of federal-state fiscal policy to be achieved? )Whichis the proper forumjudicial or legislative-for the formulation of possible solutions? Traditionally, the Court has applied a formal standard in determining the validity of a
state tax imposed on a local activity related to interstate commerce. Direct
burdens are forbidden while remote or indirect burdens may be permitted in
the circumstances of a particular case. For a brief period extending from 1938
to the early 1940's, Mr. Justice Stone attempted to substitute a "multiple burden" test in place of the mechanistic direct-indirect formula based upon incidence. In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue127 he urged the adoption of
a measure grounded on "practical rather than logical distinctions," while two
years later he buttressed his argument for flexibility on the basis of "reason and
2
of a due regard for the just balance between national and state power."1 8
These efforts proved to be short-lived, however, and in a series of cases decided
in 1944 and the years immediately following, the Court reverted to a formalis1 29
tic approach.
because of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes the tax invalid is the
fact that there is interference by a State with the freedom of interstate commerce.... For
not even an 'internal regulation' by a State will be allowed if it directly affects interstate
commerce." Id. at 256-58. For an excellent guide to the entire area, see HARTMAN, STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953). A useful review of earlier cases appears in
Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HA.v. L. REv. 949

(1941).
126 For a recent review, see Studenski & Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation,
56 HARv.Bus. REv. 77 (1958).
127 303 U.S. 250 (1938).

12$ McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
129 A return to formalism became evident in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327

(1944), and continued to be reflected in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S,
602 (1951), and Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
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The Warren Court, in its first test of the application of the commerce clause
to state taxation, held unanimously that a state levy violated the constitutional
proscription. At issue in Michigan-WisconsinPipe Line Co. v. Calvert"3o was a
Texas tax on the occupation of "gathering gas" measured by the entire volume
of gas "taken" as applied to an interstate natural gas pipeline company. Mr.
Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion, found that the activity was such an
integral part of the interstate process that it could not realistically be separated
from it. Despite the pedestrian character of the result, the opinion is distinguishable in tenor from previous cases in which the "direct burden" test was
applied. Clark, who consistently has supported a latitudinarian view of state
taxing powers, avoided the narrow assumptions of a mechanical formula.131
He asserted in positive terms that, in the absence of congressional action, interstate commerce and its instrumentalities were not immune from state taxation.
Indeed, Clark avouched the state's "rightful desire" to require that interstate
business bear its share of the costs of local government. Obviously, the tone of
such declarations was not indicative of a mere re-espousal of formalism. Instead, it augured a return to a more flexible approach based upon considerations of constitutional policy having reference to substantial effects.
In Railway Express Agency v. Virginia,132 a closely divided Court struck
down a state tax on express companies, measured by gross receipts from intrastate business, as applied to a firm engaged exclusively in interstate business.
The statutory language had termed the exaction a privilege tax which tradi133
Mr. Justionally was suspect as a "direct burden" on interstate commerce.
tice Jackson, speaking for a majority, held that local incidents which constituted an integral part of interstate commerce were not adequate grounds for a
state license, privilege, or occupation tax. Mr. Justice Clark, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas,
would have accepted the judgment of the state court that the tax was an ad
valorem levy on intangible property. He denounced the Court's approach as
one based wholly upon semantics: "If the label makes the tax invalid, the label
34
is accepted; if the label validates the tax, the Court will pierce the label."1
The most recent version of Railway Express Agency v. Virginia 35 reveals con130 347 U.S. 157 (1954).

131 See, for example, his previous dissent in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340
U.S. 602, 610 (1951).
132 347 U.S. 359 (1954).

133 The State Corporation Commission and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
upheld the validity of the levy as a property tax measured by gross income and laid on the
intangible value of good-will or going-concern status. The United States Supreme Court
adhered to the characterization of the legislature on the ground that gross revenue as a
measure "is consistent with a tax on the privilege of doing a volume ofbusiness which would
yield that revenue... ." Id. at 367.
134 Id.at 371.
135 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
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sideration of essentially the same issues but in an atmosphere more receptive
to state power. Here, the Court upheld what the state legislature now designated a "franchise tax" on express companies, measured by gross receipts
from operations within the state, in lieu of all other property taxes on intangibles and rolling stock. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking in this instance for a
majority, maintained that commerce clause objections had been eliminated by
the new law since the tax was levied expressly on property rather than on
privilege. The state legislature, he averred, "has made crystal-clear that the tax

is now a franchise tax. .

".."136

Restrictions stemming from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment have served to impose additional limitations upon the power of the
states to tax. Indeed, territorial restraints were recognized as fundamental
prior to the adoption of the amendment. Establishment of an adequate nexus
between the state and the taxed commerce currently is required if due process
is to be satisfied. Problems of extraterritoriality often arise and, to some extent,
these may be solved in terms of an apportionment formula allocating to the
taxing state its "fair share" of the tax imposed on a multistate enterprise. It is
possible, in this connection, that a levy may meet the minimum standards
implicit in the concept of due process and yet be invalidated on commerce
grounds.
In Miller Bros. v. Maryland137 the Court was required to determine the liability of a Delaware merchandising corporation for the collection and payment of a Maryland use tax. The extent of the store's contacts with the taxing
state comprised advertising which reached Maryland customers, the mailing of
occasional sales circulars, and deliveries to purchasers in Maryland. Were
these sufficient, in a constitutional sense, to provide the nexus necessary to
meet due process requirements? Justice Jackson, speaking for a majority, refused to sustain the liability asserted by the state on the ground that there had
not been established an acceptable minimum connection between the state and
the transaction which it sought to tax. The majority distinguished previous
decisions in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n 38 and Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.139 involving "active and aggressive operation within a taxing
state" as wholly unlike the instant case where there "was no invasion or ex40
ploitation of the consumer market."1
136 Id. at 438.
138 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
137 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
139 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
140 347 U.S. at 347. In view of the negative due process holding, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the statute imposed an unjustifiable burden upon interstate
commerce. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Clark, dissented on the basis of the general principles announced in the General Trading
case. The due process clause, he contended, should not prevent the state from exercising
jurisdiction since "this is not a case of minimal contact between a vendor and the collecting
State." Id. at 358. The principles enunciated in the GeneralTrading case were reaffirmed and
Miller Bros. was distinguished in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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A perplexing due process issue-novel in conception and in applicationhas arisen from recent state formulas for the taxation of interstate air carriers.
The Court, in its first approach to the problem in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota,'41 could offer no clear-cut solution based upon precedent. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, announcing the conclusion and judgment of a divided
Court, upheld a property tax levied by the domiciliary state upon all of the
carrier's flight equipment. In the circumstances of the case, he held, there was
no indication that the airline had attained a tax situs which would have subjected it to taxation in any other state. The Court, therefore, left unanswered
the central question whether future decisions should be based upon an apportionment theory derived from the railroad rolling-stock cases or upon the
older "home port" theory of the ship cases where sole taxing authority was
conferred on the domiciliary state. 142 Mr. Justice Black, concurring, refused to
foreclose consideration of the taxing rights of states other than the home
state. Mr. Justice Jackson, on the other hand, condemned the apportionment
theory as a "mongrel one, a cross between desire not to interfere with state
taxation and desire at the same time not utterly to crush out interstate commerce."1 43 The physical basis of the state's relationship to the rolling stock of
railroads, he contended, was wholly lacking with respect to airplanes. The
best analogy, in Jackson's view, was the "home port" theory applied to
ships.144
The Court reconsidered the due process aspects of air transportation in
45
BraniffAirways, Inc. v. NebraskaState Bd. of Equalization.1
At issue was the
constitutionality of an apportioned ad valorem property tax levied by Nebraska on the flight equipment of an interstate carrier. The line was not incorporated in the state nor was its principal place of business or home port located in Nebraska. Its sole connection consisted of eighteen daily in-state
stops of short duration. The question, therefore, was whether a sufficient nexus
existed, measured by due process standards, for the imposition of the tax. Mr.
141322 U.S. 292 (1944).

142 Seagoing vessels traditionally have been taxable at the domicile or "home port" of the
owner. Until the late 1940's, a similar standard governed the taxability of vessels moving in
interstate commerce along the inland waterways unless an actual situs had been acquired in
another state by continuous employment there. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S.
63 (1911). This general rule was modified in Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S.
169 (1949), where the Court applied the apportionment principle to inland water transportation. The formula approved was comparable to that which Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891), first applied to railroad cars in interstate commerce.
143 322 U.S. at 306.

144 Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices
Roberts, Reed, and Rutledge, denounced the tax sustained by the Court as "so obviously
disproportionate to the protection afforded to the taxed property by the taxing state as to
place a constitutionally intolerable burden on interstate commerce." He called for an apportionment based upon the principles formerly enunciated in the railroad cases. Id. at 325.
145 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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Justice Reed, writing for a majority, dispelled many of the doubts which had
been raised by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Northwest. He
dismissed allegations that the tax was precluded by federal regulation of air
transportation or that it constituted an unwarranted burden on interstate commerce. Instead, Mr. Justice Reed focused attention upon the situs issue and
found that the contacts were adequate to sustain the exercise of the state's
taxing power. The indecisive approach of Northwest was abandoned when the
Court, in terms, adhered to the apportionment formula of the railway car
cases. By rejecting the home port theory of the ocean vessel decisions, it placed
air commerce within a taxing framework more closely analogous to that ap146
plied to other high-speed instrumentalities of multistate transportation.
In a dramatic and unprecedented action during the past term the Court
upheld the constitutionality of state net income tax levies on out-of-state corporations whose activities were "exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce."1 47 Despite findings in the state courts that the taxes violated the commerce and due process clauses of the Constitution, the Court, in almost all
respects, treated the cases as though intrastate rather than interstate commerce
were at issue. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court in Northwestern States
PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota,148 applied time-honored standards of discrimination, burden, and nexus and, on all counts, found no constitutional
infirmity. The incidence of the taxes, he concluded, afforded "a valid 'constitutional channel' which the States have utilized to 'make interstate commerce
pay its way.' "149 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, took issue with the majority determination of the question on the basis of precedents applicable to
intrastate commerce. The decision, in his view, served to break new ground in
an area essentially nonjudicial in nature.150
This latitudinarian approach to state taxing powers, dramatically evident
recently, has not been limited to the commerce and due process clauses. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers,151 the Court upheld the application
of state taxes to materials imported from abroad for use in manufacturing and
146 Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion which served to amplify earlier views
expressed in Northwest, condemned the tendency to transfer doctrines developed for one set
of circumstances to another. He admitted that the connection with the taxing state in this
instance was not so tenuous as to offend due process. However, he asserted that the incidence of the levy violated the commerce clause. Frankfurter urged that a constructive adjustment of competing considerations in this area was beyond the scope of the judicial process
and could be achieved only by congressional action. Id. at 603.
147 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959). The two cases were consolidated for decision.
148Supra note 147.

149 Id. at 464.
150 Id.at 470.
151 358 U.S. 534 (1959). For a discussion of the case in the light of the "original package"
doctrine, see Note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1246 (1959).
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stored temporarily. Since such stocks were irrevocably committed to supply
and were actually being used to meet the daily requirements of manufacturing
plants, Mr. Justice Whittaker, who wrote the prevailing opinion, ruled that all
phases of the importation process had ended and the materials had lost their
distinctive character and immunity as imports. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting with Mr. Justice Harlan, charged that the Court's interpretation of the
import-export clause contravened precedents that had established the constitutional immunity from state taxation of goods awaiting sale or manufac52
ture.1
It is clear, in assessing the current judicial approach to the taxation of multistate enterprises, that the Court has turned from a position of what might be
termed formalistic negativism to one of outright deference to state power. The
decision in Northwestern States removes the long-standing barrier to state
taxation of activities exclusively in interstate commerce. Nor does the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment any longer serve to preclude the
taxation of multistate businesses with minimal contacts on the basis of insufficiency of nexus.153 Absent the recent reversal of this trend by congressional
action, the broad interdictions of the commerce and due process clauses might
have come to have little effect upon the revenue policies of the states. What the
states achieved in 1959 by judicial action was a status akin to that which they
were afforded during the late 1930's in the control of other aspects of their
internal economies.
Why did the Court execute a retreat from the traditional standards to which
it had adhered in a long series of cases involving the taxation of multistate
enterprises? Perhaps the new approach reflected a feeling of judicial incompetence in the determination of the economic effects of state levies upon the
stream of commerce. Or, conceivably, it may have been designed to precipitate
an exercise of broad policy-making powers indisputably vested in Congress by
the commerce clause.1 54 In any event, the Court did not wholly abandon the
discrimination and burden rules which it had utilized so effectively in the past.
Instead, it reaffirmed their applicability. The novelty of the Northwestern
States decision lies in its obliteration of the ill-defined boundaries which sepa55
rate intrastate from interstate commerce.'
152 358 U.S. at 551.
153 This aspect may have been influenced by the liberalization of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the due process clause in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). At issue in McGee was the amenability of a defendant corporation to the process of
the state in an in personam action.
154 See text at pages 85-86 infra.
155 A marked degree of consistency is evident in decisions involving state or local taxes
which impose a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. Where such cases have
arisen, the Court has been virtually unanimous in striking down "privilege" taxes "having a
substantial exclusory effect on interstate commerce." See West Point Grocery Co. v.
Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957).
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CONGRESS, THE COURT, AND THE FEDURAL SYSTEM

Despite a generally broad application of the judicial doctrine of deference
in all of the crucial areas defining the federal-state relationship, the Warren
Court continues to be the object of criticism for an attitude which, paradoxically, is alleged to be hostile to the "legitimate" exercise of state functions and
to traditional concepts of federalism. Moreover, detractors of the Court contend that, since most of the controversial decisions have been grounded on the
plane of statutory construction, Congress is peculiarly suited to provide a corrective counterpoise in the current struggle. Presumably, the national legislature may interpose its powers to modify or, if need be, to reverse anti-state
holdings. But, the questions remain: To what extent has Congress been willing
to assume a revisionary role dedicated to a purported restoration of the federal-state balance? In what areas has legislative action achieved positive
results ?
The Jenner-Butler "omnibus bill" of the 85th Congress represented the
most ambitious anti-Court proposal to reach the floor of either chamber. The
Jenner bill, in its original form, would have stripped the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to hear appeals in five types of cases.15 6 As amended and reported
by the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, the bill's effect upon federalstate controversies was limited to the reversal of Konigsberg157 and Schware15 8
and to undermining the holding in Nelson.159 It would have denied the Court
jurisdiction to review state decisions relating to admissions to the practice of
law and would have included a legislative declaration that the federal antisedition laws were not to be construed as prohibiting state enforcement of
otherwise valid state acts. 160 A companion House measure of comparable
156 The original version of S.2646 would have precluded Supreme Court review in any
case where there was drawn into question the validity of contempt convictions arising out of
investigations by congressional committees; proceedings involving the dismissal of federal
employees on security grounds; state laws and regulations relating to the control of subversion; rules or bylaws of a school board concerning subversive activities in its teaching body;
and state regulation of admissions to the bar. Senator Jenner indicated in his testimony
before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that the measure was designed to overcome the effect of the Court's decisions in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); and Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). See Hearings
Before Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws, on the Limitation of Appellate Jurisdictionof the United
States Supreme Court, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17 (1957), and 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 18
(1958).
157Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra note 156.
158 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
159 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
160 See SEN. REP. No. 1586, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).

84

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:53

scope was lacking and, in the closing days of the 1958 session, the Senate
tabled the Jenner-Butler bill.161
The most persistent "corrective" measure relates wholly to the doctrine of
preemption. During the past half-decade, numerous bills have been introduced to modify the Court's "nationally-oriented" approach by providing a
rule of statutory construction indicative of legislative intent not to preclude
state jurisdiction. However, serious consideration has been accorded only one,
H.R. 3,162 which has borne this designation in three successive Congresses.
The proposal stipulates that federal laws are not to be construed as superseding state enactments unless Congress has specifically stated that it wishes to
preempt the field or unless there is such direct and positive conflict between the
federal act and the state law that the two cannot be reconciled. The current
version includes a second section designed expressly to reverse the Court's
interpretation of the Smith Act in the Nelson case. Indeed, it was Nelson which
provided the essential impetus facilitating passage of H.R. 3 by the House in
both the 85th and 86th Congresses.163 On both occasions, the measure failed
to receive Senate approval although affirmative action on a bill limited to the
enforcement of state sedition statutes was narrowly averted by a dramatic
move on the part of the Senate leadership in the 85th Congress.1 64 Undoubtedly, the Court's recent decision in Uphaushas effectively staved off action by the
upper house in the 86th Congress.
Aside from these abortive efforts and others where consideration of bills
never proceeded beyond the committee stage, there have been three areas in
which statutes have altered the Court's role in federal-state relations. None has
involved any action remotely approaching the drastic restrictions envisioned
by those hostile to the Court. None might properly be characterized as "ripper
legislation." In one area, judicial decisions have been modified not to redress
the balance in favor of the states but because the Court has read state powers
too broadly.
The "no-man's-land" section of the recently enacted labor reform bi11165
represents the most significant congressional effort to provide a remedy where
a jurisdictional void formerly existed. The act does not purport to reverse traditional holdings of the Court in commerce clause litigation. Instead, it is limited to a definition of legislative intent covering a relatively narrow area in
which the Court itself has intimated that legislative action was sorely
161See 104 CONG. REC. 18687 (1958).

162 See generally HearingsBefore House Committee on the Judiciaryon EstablishingRules
of InterpretationGoverning Questions of the Effect of Acts of Congresson State Laws, 84th

Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9 (1956), 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15 (1958), and 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959).
163 See 104 CONG. REc. 14162 (1958); 105 CONG. REc. 11808 (1959).
164 The bill was recommitted by a 41 to 40 roll-call vote. 104 CONG. Rsc. 18928 (1958).
165 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I, 1959).
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needed.166 The act reaffirms the discretionary power vested in the National
Labor Relations Board to decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
where the effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of the Board's authority. However, the Board is not permitted to
broaden, beyond existing limits, the area in which it refuses to take jurisdiction. Significantly, the act contains an express congressional disclaimer removing any legal barriers to the assumption of state jurisdiction over labor
67
disputes which fall within the Board's non-jurisdictional category.1
The 86th Congress acted to curb rather than to broaden state powers in the
field of taxation. The immediate problems created by the Court's decision in
Northwestern States,168 coupled with fears that the decision constituted a major step toward the abolition of a nation-wide "common market," touched off
a flurry of activity to provide stop-gap relief.16 9 The "corrective" measure, as

finally enacted, effects a temporary "freeze" until recommendations for permanent legislation can be made. It prohibits state taxation of the income of
out-of-state firms which do not maintain places of business within its boundaries.170 Ultimately, Congress will be required to fashion a "balance of interests" formula capable of meeting the revenue needs of the states without placing an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The least controversial of the recent measures was an act increasing from
$3,000 to $10,000 the amount necessary to confer jurisdiction on the district
courts in federal question litigation and in cases arising out of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties. In addition, the Judicial Code was amended to provide that a corporation should be deemed a citizen of the state in which its
principal place of business is located as well as of the state of incorporation. 171
The underlying purpose of the legislation was to reduce the current backlog of
cases pending on the court calendars and to facilitate a reduction in future
workloads. Whether the act will effect a notable transfer of cases to the state
court dockets is highly doubtful. In view of the magnitude of present-day damage claims, the new jurisdictional minimum of $10,000 would seem to be of
72
little, if any, deterrent value.1
If recent congressional performance may be taken as an indicator of future
action under like circumstances, the Court will continue to emerge unscathed
166 See H. R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1959).
167 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. I, 1959). Claims of federal preemption under
the statute are considered in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
168 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
169 See HearingsBefore the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on State Taxation
on Interstate Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
170 73 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. I, 1959).
171 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(c) (1958).
17

7 See the comment concerning the possible effects of the statute in 72 HAgv. L. REv. 391
(1958).

86

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 28:53

from attacks upon its appellate jurisdiction-at least in the exercise of its traditional supervisory role in the federal system. Even staunch supporters of the
judiciary can find little fault with the legislative product thus far revealed.
Judged by any reasonable standard, the statutes reflect a remedial rather than
a punitive approach. Perhaps the greatest threat to the powers of the Court
arose and was overcome during the 85th Congress when, by close votes, proposals of broad scope were debated and shunted aside. To be sure, similar
bills were introduced in the 86th Congress, but proponents of these measures
were unable to secure any positive action in either house. In familiar, timehonored fashion, subtle changes in the Court's treatment of controversial issues and ever-shifting majorities seem once again to have contributed intangibly, but dramatically, to a reduction of legislative pressures.
JuDIciAL TRENDs IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS: A Su m'TG up
What general inferences emerge from this examination of the principal judicial pivots upon which modem federalism hinges? How may a balance sheet
be drawn to indicate the relative strengths and weaknesses of state and nation ?
The following observations, in summary form, serve to describe the current
status of the developing pattern:
1. The Warren Court has not been an innovator of the preemption or
"new" due process doctrines. Instead, a shift in emphasis is the major distinguishing characteristic. The Court has applied old doctrines in areas-sedition, for example-where they were hitherto unknown although the principle
of supersedure outside commerce clause litigation had been established more
than a decade earlier.
2. With respect to economic relationships, the Court has continued, if not
expanded, a policy of deference to state legislation. There are no indications
that due process will be revived to strike down any experimental social programs which may be instituted. Presumably, the doctrine of preemption could
be substituted for or made complementary to due process if, as seems unlikely,
the Court should embark on a course reminiscent of that followed during the
1920's and early 1930's.
3. A permissive pattern has emerged from cases defining the scope of state
powers of taxation. When judged by the standards current a generation ago,
recent decisions fall little short of a revolution injudicial attitudes. Long-established barriers have been removed in such controversial areas as interstate
commerce and intergovernmental immunities.
4. Deference to state decisional law has developed in federal question cases
involving open choice-of-law questions and in those arising out of the traditional diversity relationship. Expansion of the Erie doctrine, sometimes overlooked as a "technical revision" of the 1930's, has had a profound effect upon
the federal-state balance. The related doctrine of equitable abstention, present-
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ly limited in its application, remains an important indicator of a federal policy
to defer to the primacy of state adjudications wherever feasible.
5. There is little doubt that the balance in the federal system has turned
against the states in most areas where individual liberties are at issue. Behind
the legal facade of preemption and due process lie the strong predilections of a
majority of the Justices in favor of a vigorous "civil rights" approach. The labor-management cases, which had created a power vacuum in the absence of
congressional action, also seemed to turn on the assumption that a totality of
federal control would be more beneficial to the rights of labor than any measure of state regulation.
6. The Court, as a coordinate branch of government, is on stronger ground
today than it was during the constitutional crisis of the 1930's. Its decisionsparticularly in the application of supersedure techniques-are unassailable as
perpetually binding pronouncements (though political attacks upon them have
been rife) since Congress may provide corrective measures at will. Nevertheless, the Court has lost little of the preeminence which it formerly enjoyed in
the constitutional adjudication of federal-state problems. Experience has indicated that congressional majorities to overturn Supreme Court decisions are
not easily obtained.
7. The Court's role as "umpire" in federal-state relations remains secure.
Its position will change little even if a broadly conceived and potentially expansive bill is enacted expressing congressional intent to establish interpretive
rules governing questions of the effect of federal acts upon state laws. In the
final analysis, the success or failure of any such general statute would rest
largely on the construction given to it by the Court.

